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Geert Wilders...
...the Eurabia Myth
...and the moral panic of
"Islamification" in the Netherlands and Europe.
Research paper in progress ... study framework
presentation for "Islamification" moral panic study.
Introduction
The past decades after WWII have seen
the rise of far-right parties that have their runs and quicky fade into
obscurity. This time, in the post September 11 world, the far-right, such as
the "Freedom Party" of the Netherlands, are finding common issue with the
"threat" of the "Islamification of Europe" coming from, supposedly, European
Muslims. Long cherished national identities, such as the tolerance and human
rights advocacy of the Netherlands, are being thrown out in favor more
nationalistic policies aimed exclusively at addressing the "Islamification"
question. Moral entrepreneurs, like Geert Wilders, are gaining political ground
based on the scare of less than one million Muslims in the Netherlands'
population of 16 million. Wilders could be the next Dutch Prime Minister and
bring about policies aimed at undermining the religious freedom of Dutch
Muslims. These proposed policy changes will mark a radical change in Dutch
national identity, but are viewed as "necessary" in light of a Dutch public
mood that believes that Islam is incompatible with the Dutch way of life. There
are a number of books published in North America that promote the myth of a
"coming Eurabia" and warn of "Europe's Islamification" peddled by Geert
Wilders.
The main purpose of this
research project is to establish the extent of the "Eurabia" and
"Islamification of the Netherlands" moral panic. The situation with regard to
Dutch and European Muslims has all the basic hallmarks of a moral panic
according to classic moral panic theory as described by Stanley Cohen and the
further work of Erich Goode and Nachman Ben Yehuda. This classic framework will
be used to answer the question of what is the extent that the conspiracy
theories of "Muslim invasion of Europe" in order to "create Eurabia" serve as a
moral panic in the Netherlands?
The prediction here is that not only
is the concern about "Muslims" a classic moral panic that is unjustifiable
though reasonable and rational research about European Muslims, but the notion
of "Islamification of Europe" is the bread and butter for Europe's far right.
So, Hypothesis One is that the scare in the Netherlands about "Muslims in
Europe" is based on books of the "Eurabia" genre. Because of this genre of
books, Hypothesis Two states that the emergence of the far- right
political figures, like Geert Wilders, is a result of the scare about "Muslims
in Europe." Hypothesis Three demands that we discover the truth
as there is nothing to fear from Dutch and European Muslims and immigration
from Muslim countries is harmless. We
could also find that much of Wilders' support comes from he Western side of the
Atlantic.
Moral Panic - definitions and theory structure.
We can arrive at a definition
of "moral panic" first by looking at the definitions researcher that first
investigated and defined the term. Even as Stanley Cohen in his 2005 addition
of Folk Devils and Moral Panics lamented the overuse of the term after his 1964
study (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1996, 23). The definition from Stanley Cohen below
is directly referenced by several authors, (Garland 2008, Goode and Ben-Yehuda
1996, ) and it will also be referenced for this study:
"A condition, episode, person, or group of persons
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its
nature is presented in stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;
the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right-thinking people, socially accredited experts pronounce and diagnoses and
solutions; ways of coping are evolved ...or resorted to; until the condition
disappears...Sometimes the object of panic is quite novel and at other times it
is something that has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in
the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in
folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and
long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and
social policy or even the way society conceives of itself" (Cohen 2005, 1).
Cohen described various elements to moral panic to arrive
at a more comprehensive description of moral panic. The indicators, as Goode
and Ben Yehuda (1998) call them, identify the characteristics of moral panic
and they are crucial elements (33). These five elements are concern (from a
potential "threat" more than fear, about the behavior of a certain group );
hostility (toward the collective enemy, the "folk devils" and those
responsible, who may also become "folk devils"); consensus (agreement among the
public, elites and policy-makers that the "threat" exists and that something
should be done about "it"); disproportionality (exaggeration of the "threat,"
the risk, the harm if ignored); volatility - panic erupts and disappears (Goode
and Ben Yehuda 1998, 33-41; Cohen 2005, xxii).
The most important of the element of moral panic that needs
to be under stood for the purposes of study is disproportionality. First, moral
panic operates on the assumption that there is a sense on the part of a sizable
portion of the public that there are groups and individuals in the society that
are engaged in threatening behaviors that are either non-existent or that do
not match the degree of public concern does about the actual threat. A large
number of the public believe that the threatening behaviors are a great concern
and need to be dealt with (consensus). There is an "objective molehill being
made into a mountain" and to establish a moral panic there must be the
presentation of objective reality. We must establish that the pubic concern
over the "threat" is out of proportion and over-blown and the whole concept of
moral panic rests on demonstrating disproportional response on the part of the
public (Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998, 36-38; Cohen 2005, xxviii). That is what
this study will do, present especially recent studies of the European Muslim
population and call into ethnical question of "counting Muslims" and the
presence of "Muslims" as a threat to European society and the disproportionate
reactions of the European public to "the Muslim invasion."
Proportionate reaction and measurements. A critique
of the moral panic holds that the analysis uses his own judgment as to the
proportionality of the public's concern regarding the behavior, problem or
deviance of "folk devil." There are times when the public should be concerned
with a social or moral problems, like muggings and rioters, and it is
inaccurate to judge such as "panic" popular fears that are well grounded and
concerns that are rightfully expressed (Garland 2008, 15; ). If there is a wide
spread consensus that "Muslims are invading" to "islamify Europe" and there is
a good share of evidence to prove that this reaction is disproportionate, or
even a myth, then we have a moral panic and not just some rightfully expressed
concern about "Muslims" that might be a rightful concern with "muggers." It is
not legitimate for Europeans in the Netherlands to be concerned with the
presence of Muslims in their countries.
The actors in the drama of moral panics.
There are five chief actors in the drama of moral panics
that the analyst needs to conceder: the press, the public, law enforcement,
politicians and political figures, and action groups.
The press and mass media. All societies posses sets
of ideas about what is deviance and what causes deviance. For example, is a
certain deviant behavior, smoking marijuana, a sickness, a crime, or a medical
therapy for certain medical conditions? Do people that sell marijuana sell a
dangerous drug or are they dispensing medicine? The nature of the information
that the society and its social control agents receives are of critical
importance in understanding how the mass media define and shape social and
moral problems. In the western, industrialized world, we get our information
second hand after the "facts" we receive have been processed, shaped by
commercial and political constraints of the mass media, that can set the stage
for new rule creation and moral enterprise. Since moral panic is characterized
by feelings held by a substantial number members of a society that "evildoers
are a threat to our society and its way of life," these feelings are stoked,
defined and shaped though press and media coverage of events (Goode and Ben
Yehuda 1998 31; Cohen 2005 7-8 )
Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate argue that after the 9-11
terrorist attacks we were told by academic experts that we "face a new for of
terrorism." The "debates" in academic circles include the notion that the
"world changed forever on September 11, 2001." British PM Tony Blair has stated
the "new terrorism" is compatible with the threat from Nazism and the
revelations of "foiled plots" have helped ratchet up the public concern about
the "new terrorism." The authors then argue that it is important that the media
play an important role in shaping public perceptions about the "new terrorism"
risk with eye-catching and sensational events that can have an appeal to basic
instincts and a shared sense of morality. (2006 124, 125, 126, 130).
Law enforcement and social control agents. In a
moral panic, a society becomes sensitive to "trouble from certain quarters" and
the society then expects law enforcement and other social control agents (ex.
the courts) to "do something about this threat." When these agents of social
control step up their efforts in intensity, become punitive and over-zealous
beyond what is justified on the basis of the actual threat - this is called
escalation - and includes the introduction of "new methods" to deal with the
"threat," which include expanded police powers, such as the banning clothing
worn by folk devils, and the introduction of previously unacceptable powers,
such as riding suspicious persons out of town (Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998, 27).
Politicians and political figures. The "need to do
something about this threat" strengthens ties between local and national social
control agents and political figures, legislative leaders that implement
national solutions, such as the suspension of rights and freedoms that were
previously enjoyed. In the incidents with the Mods and Rockers, Members of
Parliament (MPs) took interest in the disturbances in their constituencies,
held meeting with chiefs of police, with reports sent to the Home Secretary.
Statements during the time called for "jailing the wild ones." Some moderating
political figures had recognized that the concerns about the "hooligans" were
exaggerated, but the mood was angry, self-righteous, vindictive and punitive.
Some observed that the politicians and groups had picked an "easy target" that
"hardly existed." "The symbolic alignment of politicians and groups against the
devil and on the side of angels is a defining aspect of moral panic" (Goode and
Ben Yehuda 1998 27-28; Cohen 2005; xxiii).
The Public. While the media and press provide the
second hand information that can stoke a moral panic. However, there must be
latent potential in the public for which the mass media and press can provide
the raw material out of which a media campaign can construct images of fear and
dread. In other words, the media's campaign must touch something of nerve
already present in the general public (Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998 26). Goode and
Ben Yehuda describe the mood of the Britain of the 1960s as one where the World
War Two generation had the deprivation and sacrifice of war still fresh and
viewed the affluent and rebellious generation as one that has been coddled.
This generation believed that the solution was tougher parental controls and
jail sentences (Hunt 1997 631).
The "locus" of moral panics according to the Goode and Ben
Yehuda frameworks are fear that manifests itself as beliefs, actions and
sentiments that are expressed by specific individuals in a society. Who
is panicked by the current condition?
Action groups. Along the course of a moral panic
there are generated "action groups" that arise to cope with the newly defined
threat. Moral Entrepreneurs, which was emphasized by Howard Becker, that want
to change the rules to address a "profound evil" that nothing in the world is
right until the rules are changed to address the "evil." Moral Entrepreneurs
are such groups and social movements that are formed as a result of the
"threat" and who believe that remedies to address the "threat" are ineffective.
The Moral Entrepreneurs concept applies to definition of deviant behavior,
strengthening of the social controls apparatus, to "correct evil." Moral
Entrepreneurs see themselves as humanitarians that are doing society a good and
believe that "getting others to do what is right is good for them" and for
society as a whole. Attempts to criminalize certain behaviors and influence the
content of law are central features of a moral panic (Cohen 2005, xxiii; Goode
and Ben Yehuda 1998 28; 29; 81, 80, 82).
Moral entrepreneurs operate on a wide range of fronts.
The many efforts of moral entrepreneurs relevant to the generation and
maintenance of a moral panic include: attempting to influence public opinion by
discussing the extent of the supposed extent of the threat in the media,
forming organizations and generating entire social movements to deal with the
problems the threat presumably poses; giving talks or conducting seminars to
inform the public of how to counter the threat in
question&ldots;discrediting spokespersons who advocate, oppose or offer
competing perspectives (Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998, 82).
Moral panic as a disaster mentality and its
preparations.
David L. Altheide tells us that fear is often
harvested to promote support from the "silent majority" for the purpose of
bringing about more social control measures. News formats feature crime and
criminal activities that provoke a narrative of fearful framing of issues. Part
of the framing of fear by the media was that "required state intervention" was
build on foundation of fear of "the Other" and especially "the Other deviant's"
groups and lifestyles (2009 85-86).
As described by Stanley Cohen, the fear of the behavior or
activity that "is a threat to our way of life" in the course of a moral panic
can take on the form of disaster preparations. So, the Other, the immigrant,
migrant, especially the asylum seeker, immigrant and his claims as "bogus"
often takes on, according to Michael Welch and Liza Schuster (2005) components
of race and ethnicity, with dehumanizing descriptions of disasters, such as
flood, tidal waves and water related disasters (400).
Folk devils and deviant immigrants.
The folk devil is the scapegoat, "the Other deviant," that
is the object of the moral panic, upon which the public puts its fears and
dreaded fantasies. By their nature, moral panics seek to root out folk devils
(Hunt 1997, 631; Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998, 28-29).
"A condition that generates such widespread public
concern must have had a personal agent responsible for its inception and
maintenance. Such evil does not arise out of happenstance or thin air; there
must be a circle of evil individuals who are engaged in undermining society as
we know it. {F]olk devils are deviants; they are engaged in wrongdoing; their
actions are harmful to society; they are selfish and evil; they must be
stopped, their actions neutralized. Only an effort of sustained magnitude will
permit us to return to normal" (Goode and Ben Yehuda 1998, 29).
Folk devils, according to Arnold Hunt, tend to be easy
politically targets, welfare recipients, single mothers, persons with AIDS,
than groups who are truly aggressive and anti-social. The moral panic is not
about the folk devil, the moral panic is the folk devil - and if the
folk devil would not have been perceived as the problem, he might not exists at
all without the moral panic (1997, 631).
The mobility of the modern global age is leading to a rise
of the "stranger," the refugee - asylum seeker as "deviant" though accentuating
and marking out "us versus them" division in society. The "deviant immigrant"
or "criminal immigrant" is a central feature in western nations have collapsed
into debates on the "criminal" and the punishment of "criminal immigrant." This
criminalization of asylum seekers as "bogus," "fraudulent," "benefit
scroungers," coupled with post-9-11 security concerns, have aided in
criminalizing and securitizing immigration and migration policies in Europe.
The "deviant immigrant," quintessential Other, provides a type of purifying
filter, which, especially in Europe, have obscured traditional class divisions
and brought about a new type of discourse based on "native" versus "immigrant"
attached to "who has the right to claim advantages attached to membership in
the national community." In the media aftermath of terrorist attacks, the UK
media have bundled together "illegal immigrant" and "economic migrant" into a
"breeding ground for terrorists" (Aas 2008, 11-12; Gabe and Walklate 2006 134
).
[P]unishment of immigrant crime ...seems to perform not
only the classical Durkheimian function of strengthening social bonds and
social solidarity. It also functions as a sort of 'purifying filter' protecting
the local and the national from threatening foreign elements. The law and order
discourse is thus intertwined with demands for the reinstatement of the
nation-state with clear assumptions about national identity and strong cultural
and moral boundaries. The drawing of moral boundaries, a traditional concern of
criminal law, is today performed not only through punishment, but also through
practices of banishment and expulsion (Aas 2007, 12)
The authors above point out that the "Other" psychology is
both a quality of the folk devil and of the asylum seeker. In the aftermath of
9-11, the new construction of the "Terrorist Other" was pictured and framed
through the lens of Anglo-American elites in a manner that can be viewed as
replacing the old and long gone Cold War enemy. Media portrayals of radical
Islam in a demonized and dehumanizing fashion that brought the public to a
stark separation of Western citizens and the monstrous Terrorist Other. The
misguided media construction of Terrorist Other in the weeks following 7 July
2005 saw racist reprisals the lead to a six fold increase in religious
motivated hate crimes (Gabe and Walklate 2006 131, 132).
Methodology, Data and Analysis.
The use of moral panic theory has been criticized as
turning into "panics" legitimate public fears about various forms of deviance
and behavior. For this reason a type of validity check is required to establish
a moral panic and the overreaction to an issue. For the Netherlands, a look at
the policies that target Muslims and foreigners are fair game as data. Also
fair game for data is the popularity of Geert Wilders and like-minded members,
like Pim Fortuyn - their views - and the themes associated with "Eurabia" genre
and North American right-wing websites and blogs that promote the notion of
Eurabia and "Islamification." These empirical observations of the nature of
Dutch "Eurabia" belief will be compared and contrasted to the characteristics
of the Dutch Muslims population though data sources, such as surveys, studies,
such as the PEW Center, Gallop, European Commission, Human Rights Watch, and
news reports and interviews with Dutch Muslims.
Data streams. News reports and some publications
will be in both Dutch and English languages and taken from the Google and
Lexus-Nexus search engines. Publications and case studies will be obtained (and
aleady have been obtained) from the JSTOR, SAGE Criminology and Proquest search
engines as well as Google.
The prospect of "Dutch moral panic about
Islamification" is the dependent variable, which also requires the
establishment of Dutch concerns about their Muslim population is overblown. The
purpose is not only to explore the prospect of moral panic, but to explore
Wilders' own belief in "Eurabia" and "Islamification of Europe." The contexts
and intervening conditions that gave rise to the Dutch concern about "Muslims
in Europe," (immigration issues, crime, 9-11 attacks, London and Madrid
bombings, European rejection of Iraq War) are part of the intervening
conditions that ripen for a moral panic episode.
- The first independent variable is the theme of the
Eurabia and "Islamification of Europe" genre.
- The second independent variable are the statements,
speeches, interviews with Geert Wilders (and other actors) that are associated
with the belief in Eurabia and "islamification."
- The third independent variable is the assessment of
public policies in response to Eurabia beliefs, including immigration, as
Eurabia beliefs also have a Muslim immigration component.
- A fourth independent variable is largely the Reality
Check that will be an assessment of observers, think tanks, that has assessed
both the Dutch Muslim population and Muslims in Europe. Also, books and studies
of Dutch and European Muslims will also be studied and included as part of the
fourth variable. The observations of observers, including those that have
reviewed Eurabia books, will be included in the fourth independent variable
that is to be a part of the Reality Check Tests.
These empirical observations will be patterned -matched
with the expected outcomes based on the theory of moral panic offered by Cohen
(2005) and Goode and Ben Yehuda (1995). Pattern-matching involves simple
matching data to the theoretical framework and propositions. Alternative
theories can be proposed in a section of "for further study" if patterns that
are found can match other theoretical frameworks. (Yin 2002 36-37; 116-117). A
rival explanation to moral panic is that the "panic" stems from justifiable
fears about bad behaviors by bad people. Could more use of Cohen's disaster
preparations framework also provide more of better answers for observations.
Also, the Reality Check Test is employed to check for over-reaction to
perceived threat.
The focus will be on disproportionality of the response to
the "threat" imposed by the presence of "Muslims in Europe" through the Reality
Check Test (see below). There will be the identification of the folk devil, the
main object of a moral panic, along with the five actors of a moral panic (the
press, the public, law enforcement, politicians and legislators, action
groups). The emphasis will be placed on the Moral Entrepreneurs (Geert Wilders)
and their (his) role in the concern about "Islamification of Europe" and,
especially, "Islamification of the Netherlands."
Reality Check Test in establishing disproportional
reaction to "Muslims in Europe."
The idea of "moral panic" is the disproportional response
of actors (media, the public, moral entrepreneurs) to the threat beyond what is
rational and reasonable - in light of the current reality. What is needed to
establish and describe moral panic is a "Reality Check" test on claim-makers of
a "threat" that "we need to do something about." The four main indicators,
according to the Goode and Ben-Yehuda model, is to check for moral panic based
on the requirement that a response to "Muslims in Europe" is disproportional to
the "threat" (1996, 43-45):
- "Figures exaggerated - If the figures about the "threat"
are grossly exaggerated, then the criteria for disproportionality is met.
- Figures fabricated - if the criteria for
disproportionality is also met when the available evidence is non-existent
after careful evaluation has turned up no evidence to support the claim-makers'
claims.
- Changes over time - mean that the attention paid to a
condition at a point in time is vastly greater than in past points in history
without an increase in objective seriousness. Why is this "issue" a concern now
when it has been in existence for some time in the past - then meets that
disproportionality criteria.
- Other harmful conditions - means that attention paid to
a "threat" is vastly greater than paid to another and the "threat" of the first
is not greater than that "threat" that is being ignored. When more attention is
being given to a "threat" over other real threats, the criteria of
disproportionality is met.
Contexts for European moral panic over "islamification"
and "Eurabia"
Jens Rydgren (2008) writes that immigration and
ethno-nationalism, not blatant xenophobia, is the reason for the increase in
the radical right menace in European politics. "The fear of strangers" or
"unwanted guests," according to Rydgren, is the main definition of
"xenophobia." Rydgren's study found that the radical right could mobilize voter
support though framing anti-immigrant rhetoric though the lens of criminality
and social tension, welfare chauvinism and the perceived loss of national
identity. These findings for the Netherlands did not differ, but in one aspect:
Even as voters lived in immigrant dense neighborhoods and had immigrant
associations - these voters could still be swayed by the radical right's
anti-immigrant rhetoric (760-761).
Savage also attributes the rise in xenophobic and far
right-wing in Europe as a crisis of European identity. European integration,
globalization, the European demographic decline, the economic doldrums, the
growth in Muslim populations, has brought about xenophobic and nationalist
tones in the discourse. Islam itself is viewed as incompatible with the
European way of life and is seen in terms of a threat to European identity, as
well as physical security. For fearful Europeans, issues of control and
national identity could also be playing a part. Some Scandinavian observers
believe that negative voting against the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and the
question of Turkish EU membership is a manifestation of this perspective
(39).
Cris Shore (1997) argues that the collapse of old
structures and open borders of Europe and the European Union itself, have
spread the notion of "Europeaness" and European solidarity through the
xenophobia and the excluding non-Europeans as a way to "promote togetherness."
This has also occurred as a result of the globalization age and political
transitions have led to the creations of new identities that are based on
insecurity and uncertainty.
With regard to the Netherlands, there are few authors of
note. The first is Dutch criminologist René Van Swaaningen who, like
Mythen and Walklate, bring up the concept of provoking fear of the "criminal
Other," but in the context of Dutch politics and policies. Two authors that
speak of the current Dutch political scene are Kees van Kersbergen and Andre
Krouwel, and of interest in the study of Islamification moral panic in the
Netherlands in the article "A double-edged sword! The Dutch centre-right and
the 'foreigners issue.'" In this article, we see the stage that was set for the
Islamification moral panic which, as other authors have stated, emgered out of
Dutch debates about immigration and crime control. From this and other books
and articles about the Dutch climate - we will get a clear picture of
environment Wilders emerged from.
---
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